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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae share a common concern for the judicial protection of women's rights, including the constitutional right
to reproductive autonomy. Because we believe that no ruling of this Court has had a more positive effect on the lives of
American women than Roe v. Wade, we submit this brief to explain why this Court should maintain its protection of the
right to choose abortion as defined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), through Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
The more specific interests of each of the seventy-five amici curiae are set forth in Appendix A.'
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although the constitutional protection of reproductive autonomy is cast in doctrinal terms of the liberty-based right
of privacy, the scope of such protection must be informed by an awareness of its implications for women's equality as
well. 2 Abortion restrictions that force pregnant women to bear children do more than render empty the constitutional
promise of liberty for women by profoundly structuring their lives. They do so for women alone; men are not required to
endure comparable burdens in the service of the state's abstract interest in promoting life. To ensure that the constitu-
tional guarantee of liberty "extends to women as well as to men," this Court must secure women's right to choose
abortion lest it "protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all."
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
Freely chosen and planned childbearing is often a joyous experience. But because "few decisions are more personal
and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy than a woman's decision . . .
whether to end her pregnancy," id., forced motherhood threatens the core of a woman's constitutionally valued auton-
omy in two distinct ways.
First, state interference with abortion violates the principle of bodily integrity that underlies much of the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of liberty. The process of bearing a child involves the most intimate and strenuous exercises of the
female body and psyche; compelling a woman to devote her body, mind and soul to continue an unwanted pregnancy
constitutes an invasion of our deepest sense of privacy and the primacy of self-determination. Forced continued preg-
nancy also entails a more tangible violation of physical liberty by subjecting women to a host of physical burdens and
risks that range from prolonged discomfort and pain during pregnancy and delivery, to a substantial risk of specific
medical complications, and even to death. State abortion restrictions thus require women - and women only - to
endure physical intrusions and risks that are greater than those previously found by this Court to violate the constitu-
tional principle of bodily integrity.
Second, state interference with abortion denies women the capacity to control their own lives in the most basic of
ways. The bearing and raising of children often places severe constraints on women's employment opportunities and
therefore threatens their ability to support themselves and their families. Moreover, teenagers' inability to postpone
motherhood until they have completed a basic education and are psychologically and financially equipped properly to
care for children largely predetermines the paths their lives will take before they have even developed their own identities
and aspirations. Hence, the imposition of abortion restrictions both belies the constitutional promise of personal auton-
omy and curtails women's ability to participate equally with men in the public world.
Bald assertions of an unabridged state interest in protecting the potentiality of human life, proclaimed to be suffi-
ciently "compelling" to justify these major invasions of all aspects of women's personal autonomy, must be viewed by
this Court with great skepticism. There is no logical stopping point at which such an asserted interest can be cabined.
Thus, this Court's cognizance of this interest as "compelling" would not only result in the unprecedented evisceration of
a fundamental right; it would also provide states with an open-ended invitation to impose a wide range of other liberty-
curtailing policies on pregnant women, dictating their employment, health care, diet, exercise, and even leisure activities.
Moreover, that a state chooses to advance its interest in potential life by restricting women's reproductive autonomy,
thereby resurrecting archaic stereotypes about women's proper role in society, counsels further against recognition of
that interest as "compelling." States never impose comparable physical burdens or risks on men in requiring them to
protect other persons; by singling out only women to sacrifice their bodies and autonomy to protect the mere potentiality
of life, abortion restrictions both reflect and reinforce the stereotype that breeding children is women's "natural role."
This Court cannot safely cede control over the availability of abortion to a political process that can be expected to
undervalue both the importance to women of this aspect of their fundamental liberty and the burdens and risks of forced
motherhood. "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
* This amicus curiae brief has not been edited by THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND LIBERATION.
1. Amici curiae file this brief with the consent of all parties and letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk of the Court
pursuant to Rule 36.
2. Significantly, the Court decided Roe v. Wade in the same Term in which it condemned "our Nation['s] ... long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination," Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality), and began protecting women from
state legislation that would limit women's opportunities to the role of homemaker and mother. See Karst, Book Review, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1028, 1036 (1976) ("Not merely the sex discrimination cases, but the cases on contraception, abortion, and illegitimacy as well,
present various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to play in our society.").
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I. RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS INTERFERE WITH WOMEN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LIB-
ERTY BY RESTRICTING THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR
BODIES AND LIVES.
The liberty-based right to privacy includes the right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972). Indeed, control of one's own reproductive capacities is a prerequisite to the exercise of many of the
other fundamental choices that are protected from government interference by the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
guarantee, choices by which people determine their participation in the public world, define their personal lives and
structure their families.' Thus, the decision whether or not to bear a child lies, for women, "at the very heart" of the
fundamental right to liberty. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).'
At some time in their lives, most women willingly choose to bear and raise children. For many of them, having a
wanted child is a joyful and enriching experience. Yet bearing and raising children also imposes significant physical risks
and societal burdens on women, which not all women can assume at all times and in all circumstances. The constitu-
tional guarantee of liberty protects the right of women to assess those risks and burdens, and to decide if and when they
are prepared to assume them.
State restrictions on abortion therefore violate women's fundamental right to liberty in at least two different ways.'
First, they infringe on a woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing on her tremendous physical intrusions and signifi-
cant physical risks and pain. This Court has held that less invasive and dangerous government-imposed bodily intrusions
violate the constitutional guarantee of liberty. Second, because the birth of a child significantly circumscribes a woman's
life choices, state restrictions on abortion infringe on the fundamental "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of...
life" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)(emphasis omitted).6
A. Restrictive Abortion Laws Subject Women to Substantial Physical Intrusions and Risks In Violation of Their
Fundamental Right To Bodily Integrity.
A woman's body must adjust dramatically to provide nourishment and space for a developing fetus. 7 During preg-
nancy, her uterus changes from pear-shaped to nearly spherical and, by the end of pregnancy, has increased to 500 to
1000 times its original capacity. As her uterus enlarges, it displaces and compresses other bodily organs including her
heart, appendix and gastrointestinal tract. The woman's resting pulse rate increases by ten to fifteen beats per minute,
3. This Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment guards not only those rights enumerated by the Constitution but also
"those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26(1937)). The Court has long protected the liberty to decide when or whether to marry, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967), how
to raise and educate children, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
when or whether to conceive or bear children, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
4. A woman's liberty interest in making her own decision concerning whether she will bear a child does not diminish after concep-
tion occurs. Indeed, as Justice Stevens points out, "if one decision is more 'fundamental' to the individual's freedom than the other,
surely it is the postconception decision that is the more serious." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5. The Solicitor General argues that the proper constitutional inquiry is whether a woman has been afforded a "meaningful
opportunity" to avoid an unwanted pregnancy, taking into account such options as abstinence and contraception. Brief for the UnitedStates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, at 22 n.16. Not only is this proposed inquiry inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, but its factual premise that women who become pregnant have in some sense consented to the pregnancy belies reality.
Abstinence during the forty years a woman is fertile is not a viable way of life for most women, and sterilization, while effective,
requires women permanently to sacrifice rather than exercise their "interest in procreative choice." Id. Moreover, no other method of
contraception is 100% effective, and many present significant health risks that make them inappropriate for many women. Finally,
the large number of women, especially teenagers, who never receive proper information about contraception cannot be said to have a
meaningful opportunity to avoid pregnancy. These women and others who are the inevitable losers in the contraceptive lottery no more
"consent" to pregnancy than pedestrians "consent" to being struck by drunk drivers.
Indeed, underlying the Solicitor General's position appears to be the outmoded view that women ought not engage in sexualintercourse for reasons other than procreation and that those who do - unlike their male partners - deserve to be punished with an
unplanned pregnancy.
6. This Court has held that laws that interfere with women's right to choose abortion or any other fundamental right must be
strictly scrutinized and cannot stand absent a compelling state interest. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983). See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973) (strict
scrutiny required if law has "'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or
liberty").
Justice O'Connor has proposed that strict scrutiny be applied in the abortion context only to laws that "unduly burden" women's
abortion decisions. Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But unless the undue burden standard is intended to apply
to all fundamental rights (which would drastically rewrite this Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence), its application would im-
permissibly single out for weaker protection the one fundamental right unique to women.
7. J. Pritchard, P. MacDonald & N. Gant, Williams Obstetrics 181-205, 218, 260-63 (17th ed. 1985) [hereinafter Williams
Obstetrics].
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and her heart may increase slightly in size. A woman's average total weight gain during pregnancy is about 25 pounds.8
Although the extent of the physical burdens associated with pregnancy and childbirth varies from woman to woman
and the joy of having a wanted child can positively influence the way a woman experiences those physical changes, most
women experience pain and significant discomfort. Even the healthiest of women may experience nausea, intermittent
vomiting, increased frequency of urination, fatigue, back pain, difficulty sleeping, labored breathing and water retention. 9
Women also risk many serious, albeit less common, medical complications, including toxemia of pregnancy or preec-
lampsia (combination of high blood pressure, water retention and protein in urine), eclampsia (preeclampsia plus convul-
sions potentially leading to coma), gestational diabetes (glucose intolerance during pregnancy), thromboembolic disease(vascular inflammation and blood clots potentially leading to fatal pulmonary embolism), and cardiomyopathy (enlarge-
ment of the heart resulting in congestive heart failure). 10
Labor and delivery, during which a woman's body must meet extraordinary physical demands, pose additional risks.
Women usually experience extreme pain during labor and the process of vaginal delivery, which in most cases lasts for
six to twelve hours and in some cases longer.1 Vaginal delivery also entails substantial risk of infection and laceration.12
The dangers are magnified in the approximately one in four deliveries that are accomplished by cesarean section, includ-
ing risks from general anesthesia, infection and blood clots.13 Pregnancy-related death also remains a distinct possibility,
even for healthy women. Death can result from hemorrhage, hypertension, infection, or other complications from
cesarean deliveries.14
The dangers normally faced are compounded for women in "high risk" groups. Medical conditions such as systemic
lupus erythematosus, multiple sclerosis, asthma, diabetes and AIDS can be exacerbated by the physical changes attend-
ing pregnancy.' 5 These risks are even greater for older or very young women."8 The stress of carrying an unwanted
pregnancy exacerbates some of the physical consequences of pregnancy, including high blood pressure and asthma,
thereby increasing the woman's risk of serious physical consequence beyond that normally faced.' 7
This Court's protection of the right to choose abortion is based in part on its recognition of the serious physical risks
attending pregnancy: "[tihe detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice[whether to have an abortion] altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Indeed, the trimester approach developed in Roe reflected the fact
that a first trimester abortion was safer than continued pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.8
Legal abortion remains far safer than childbirth. In terms of mortality, "abortion through the 15th week of preg-
nancy is at least tenfold safer than childbearing." Cates, Smith, Rochat & Grimes, Mortality From Abortion and
Childbirth, Are the Statistics Biased? 248 J.A.M.A. 192, 196 (1982). "Moreover, the risk of death from legal induced
abortion is no higher at any point in gestation than is the risk of childbearing." C. Tietze & S. Henshaw, Induced
Abortion: A World Review 110 (1986). Similarly, the non-fatal health risks associated with legal abortion are very
limited and substantially lower than those risks, described above, created by continued pregnancy and delivery.' 9
Because after conception has occurred, continued pregnancy entails both a protracted bodily invasion and signifi-
cantly greater burdens and risks than abortion, a state's decision to prevent women from choosing abortion is an unpre-
cedented affront to the constitutional principle of bodily integrity. Indeed, because this principle is so deeply and histori-
cally embedded in our common law20 as well as our constitutional traditions, it is not surprising that government has
8. Id. at 182, 188, 194, 197.
9. Id. at 181-210, 218, 260-63.
10. Id. at 526-30, 600, 731. The recommended treatment for some of the serious complications is complete bed rest until delivery.
Id. at 750-51. Some pregnancy-related medical problems such as hemorrhoids and varicose veins (which can cause severe discomfort
and swelling, requiring surgery) can persist beyond delivery. Id. at 261-62.
11. D. Danforth, M. Hughey & A. Wagner, The Complete Guide to Pregnancy 228-31 (1983).
12. S. Romney, M.J. Gray, A.B. Little, J. Merrill, E.J. Quilligan & R. Stander, Gynecology and Obstetrics: The Health Care ofWomen 626-27, 632, 637 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Gynecology and Obstetrics].
13. L. Silver & S. Wolfe, Unnecessary Cesarean Sections: How to Cure a National Epidemic 9, 13 (1989).
14. See Williams Obstetrics, supra note 7, at 3.. In 1986, 270 women died during childbirth in the United States. Delivery by
cesarean section increases approximately four-fold the risk of death in childbirth. L. Silver & S. Wolfe, supra note 13, at 12.
15. See Williams Obstetrics, supra note 7, at 597, 600, 609, 619-20; Winton, Skin Diseases Aggravated by Pregnancy, 20 J. Am.
Academy of Dermatology 1, 7 (Jan. 1989). Medications that normally control pre-existing conditions often pose risks to fetal develop-
ment, requiring women either to accept those risks or to sacrifice their own health. See Williams Obstetrics, supra, at 260.
16. See, e.g., Williams Obstetrics, supra note 7, at 3, 539; Alan Guttmacher Inst., Teenage Pregnancy: The Problem That Hasn't
Gone Away 29 (1981).
17. See Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 12, at 726. Knowledge of fetal anomaly or of a disease, such as AIDS, that may be
passed on to the fetus, also greatly increases stress during pregnancy.
18. Roe also relied on the fact that most women faced with an unwanted pregnancy experience a significant improvement in
mental health and outlook after an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological
Association in Support of Appellees (noting that studies of mental health of pregnant women before and after abortion reveal signifi-
cant reductions in symptoms of stress after abortion and discussing methodological problems in research relied on by amici curiae
supporting Appellants).
19. Williams Obstetrics, supra note 7, at 483-88. By contrast, prior to Roe, illegal abortions performed by back-alley abortionistsled to the deaths of at least hundreds and perhaps thousands of women each year, and countless other women suffered serious, often
permanent, injuries, including sterility. See R. Schwarz, Septic Abortion 7 (1968); Cates, Legal Abortion: The Public Health Record,215 Science 1586 (1982); see also Williams Obstetrics, supra, at 484 ("Serious complications of abortion have been most often . ..
associated with criminal abortion.").
20. See discussion infra at 7.
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rarely attempted to impose analogous intrusions in other contexts.21 But the principles underlying this Court's infrequent
treatment of state-mandated intrusions in such contexts demonstrate that forced childbearing visits unacceptable viola-
tions upon women's bodily integrity.
For example, in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the Court held that, in part because of "the extent of [its]
intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity," id. at 761, a state could not,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, compel a criminal defendant to submit to an invasive surgical operation in order
to retrieve a bullet necessary for the state's prosecution. By comparison, a state-mandated continued pregnancy more
profoundly violates a woman's "dignitary interest in personal privacy." She is constantly aware for nine months that her
body is not wholly her own; the state has conscripted her body for its own ends. 22
Moreover, the Court in Winston also found that the criminal defendant's right to bodily integrity would be violated
by the state's imposition of the risks inherent in a surgical procedure consisting of a small incision in his skin and
retrieval of the bullet. By comparison, one in four pregnant women delivers by cesarean section, which requires a much
larger incision in the woman's abdomen, and is accompanied by all the risks, pain and permanent disfigurement associ-
ated with invasive surgery. Similarly, in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), this Court overturned a conviction
obtained from a "shocking" bodily invasion consisting of forced stomach pumping of a criminal suspect. The pain and
discomfort associated with having one's stomach pumped is comparable to the physical effects of pregnancy, including
morning sickness, which is experienced by many pregnant women on a recurring basis, and the compression of bodily
organs that results from the enlargement of the uterus. Given that these isolated aspects of pregnancy involve risks and
burdens comparable to those found unacceptable when imposed upon criminal defendants, the entire pregnancy and
childbirth experience certainly constitutes an intolerable bodily intrusion when imposed by the state on pregnant women.
In sum, the physical burdens imposed by the compelled continuation of pregnancy amount to a significant invasion of
women's bodily integrity.22 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has recognized, women "suffer disproportionately the profound
physical, emotional, and psychological consequences" of pregnancy. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 471 (1981). For women to maintain bodily integrity, as men do, they must not be subject to state coercion
forcing them to carry their every pregnancy to term.
B. Restrictive Abortion Laws Deprive Women Of The Freedom To Control The Course Of Their Lives And Re-
strict Their Ability To Participate In Society Equally With Men.
Few events can more dramatically constrain a woman's opportunities in life than an unplanned child. Because under
present social conditions, most women assume primary responsibility for raising their children, 4 having an unwanted
child would limit their ability fully to participate in public life. Moreover, for the many women unable to shoulder the
numerous burdens accompanying childrearing, forced motherhood would relegate them (certainly for long periods and
perhaps permanently) to a daily struggle to make ends meet; any hopes of fulfilling their own plans and dreams would be
shattered. Denying women's ability to control when and whether to bear children, thereby denying women their capacity
to define their paths through life in the most basic of ways, would contravene the principle of personal autonomy under-
lying the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee.2 5
21. Indeed, the few contexts in which states have attempted such intrusions on bodily integrity have generally involved criminal
defendants, over whom states traditionally exercise a great deal of authority, and courts have generally invalidated such attempts.
Pregnant women's bodily integrity and liberty are entitled to at least as much constitutional protection.
22. By contrast, a woman desiring to carry her pregnancy to term perceives the growing fetus as a welcome presence within her
body rather than an invasion of her privacy. Cf. Winston, 470 U.S. at 753 ("When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery
requiring general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own
will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to privacy is therefore preserved .... [But where the state] proposes to take
control of respondent's body [t]his kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over
surgical probing beneath his skin.").
23. While a woman might choose to bear children gladly and voluntarily, statutes that curtail her abortion choice are disturbingly
suggestive of involuntary servitude, prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, in that forced pregnancy requires a woman to provide
continuous physical service to the fetus in order to further the state's asserted interest. Indeed, the actual process of delivery demands
work of the most intense and physical kind: labor of 12 or more grueling hours of contractions is not uncommon. Cf. United States v.Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988) (criminal involuntary servitude is present where compulsion of services is achieved by use of
physical or legal coercion).
24. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality, 3 J. Econ. Persps. 25, 25 (1989). Although women could release their infants
for adoption, the vast majority do not relinquish them, generally because doing so is exceedingly traumatic. See, e.g., Winkler & Van
Keppel, Relinquishing Mothers in Adoption: Their Long-Term Adjustment, Monograph No. 3, Institute of Family Studies (1984).
25. Among the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the "interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions." United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, No. 87-1379, slip op. at
12 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 684-85 (1977). As Charles Fried has recognized:
"What a person is, what he wants, the determination of his life plan, of his concept of the good, are the most intimate expres-
sions of self-determination, and by asserting a person's responsibility for the results of this self-determination we give substance
to the concept of liberty." C. Fried, Right and Wrong 146-47 (1978). See also Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 288-
89 (1977) (the concept of privacy embodies the "moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others or to society as a
whole").
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Forced motherhood would particularly limit life's options for teenagers who become pregnant, even before they have
the opportunity to define their own identities and aspirations or prepare for the weighty responsibilities of motherhood.
Childbearing presently curtails many teenagers' ability to obtain even the most basic education: eight out of ten who
currently become mothers at age seventeen or younger do not complete high school, and four of ten who have a child by
the age of fifteen do not finish even eighth grade." Early motherhood also constrains teenagers' ability to earn a decent
income. In part because of their limited educational experience, teenage mothers receive lower hourly wages and earn
less annually for the rest of their lives than women who postpone childbearing.2 7 These teenage mothers earn about half
as much income as those who first give birth in their twenties, and sixty-seven percent of families headed by teenage
mothers live below the poverty level.28
Even for many women who become pregnant after their teens, opportunities in the public world are severely con-
strained. Many women lose their employment during pregnancy because employers unlawfully discriminate against them
or do not adapt their jobs either to perceived fetal hazards2 9 or to the perceived physical constraints of pregnancy;80
many other women lose their jobs or suffer significant financial hardships because employers do not provide or do not pay
for job-protected leave for childbearing or infant care." Over the long term, because today's workplace generally does
not accommodate the responsibilities of those caring for young children, and because day care often is inadequate,
unavailable, or unaffordable, many mothers (especially those who are young, unmarried, minority, or lower income)
must leave their jobs in order to care for their children.8 2 Others must either accept part-time work with significantly less
pay and few if any job benefits83 or move to less skilled positions so that they can work a regular schedule.84 Even those
remaining in their original jobs often cannot advance because their child care responsibilities conflict with job require-
ments as presently defined.8 5
As a result, childbearing imposes severe financial constraints on women, 6 many of whom depend on their income to
support themselves. Indeed, 60% of women in the labor force are either single (25%), divorced (12%), widowed (4%),
separated (4%), or have husbands whose earnings were less than $15,000 (15%).31 Many of these women even now do
not make ends meet; already, women maintain 51% of families below the poverty level, including 75% of poor black
families, 49% of poor Hispanic families, and 42% of poor white families.8 8 Childbearing and rearing thus have the
potential to limit women's life options in the most basic of ways. If this Court were to overrule Roe, thereby depriving
women of the right to control the frequency and timing of their pregnancies, it would deny women the ability to plan and
shape their futures and assume their place in the public world.89 Some of those who suffer will be teenagers for whom
26. Fielding, Adolescent Pregnancy Revisited, 299 Mass. Dep't Pub. Health 893, 894 (1978). Moreover, less than two percent ofteenage mothers complete college, compared to more than one-f fth of those women who do not bear children until age 24. Center for
Population Options, The Facts: Teenage Childbearing, Education, and Employment 1 (1987).27. This comparison holds true even when factors such as socioeconomic status are taken into account. Risking the Future.
Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing (Vol.' 1) 130 (C. Hayes ed. 1987).
28. Center for Population Options, supra note 26, at 1 (figures for families with children aged five or younger).
29. Courts have upheld exclusionary policies in the workplace, even though they appear to violate Title VII of the 1964 CivilRights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
30. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
31. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1988 18-25, H.R. Rep. No. 511, H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.(1988); R. Spalter-Roth & H. Hartmann, Unnecessary Losses: Costs to Americans of the Lack of Family and Medical Leave 5(1988).
32. See Women's Work, Men's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job 73-74 (B. Reskin & H. Hartmann eds. 1986) [hereinafterWomen's Work]. Job structures do not inevitably fail to accommodate childrearing responsibilities. Rather, societal allocation of
resources, in concert with established employment practices, operate to disadvantage individuals raising children.
33. See Blau & Ferber, Women in the Labor Market: The Last Twenty Years, in I Women and Work: An Annual Review 19, 28(L. Larwood, A. Stromberg & B. Gutek eds. 1985); O'Neill, Role Differentiation and the Gender Gap in Wage Rates in I Women
and Work: An Annual Review 50, 57.
34. Women's Work, supra note 32, at 74.
35. Id.
36. Compared to childless women, mothers earn considerably less per hour and their wages drop sharply with each additional
child. Fuchs, supra note 24, at 35. For example, of white women between the ages of 30 and 39 who worked more than 1,000 paidhours in 1986, those with 3 children earned 70 cents to every dollar earned by women with no children. Id. No similar relationbetween children and hourly earnings exists for men who become fathers. Id.
37. Women's Bureau, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Leaflet No. 88-2, 20 Facts on Women Workers 2 (1988)(based on March 1987 statistics).
38. Id. at 4; see also I. Garfinkel & S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma 12-15(1986).
39. Because Roe v. Wade has afforded women greater control over the timing of their childbearing, women have been able to planfor and minimize somewhat the accompanying burdens. In part as a result, women as a class have experienced significant economicgains over the past sixteen years, gains that would be jeopardized were the Court to deprive women of the right to chose abortion. Infact, since Roe, women's labor force representation has increased significantly, and the occupations in which they work have become
significantly less sexually segregated. Women's Work, supra note 32, at 23-24.
Moreover, the wage gap between women and men has diminished. Economist Victor Fuchs demonstrates that the group most
responsible for the decrease in the wage gap between women and men that occurred between 1980-1986 was composed of women bornbetween 1946 and 1950 who were in their late thirties in 1986. A key difference between these women and those born half a decadebefore is that they had substantially fewer children, Fuchs, supra note 24, at 36-37, and more control over the timing of the children
they did bear.
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many of life's options will be foreclosed before they have finished growing up. Some will be single mothers, whether
widowed, divorced, or never married, who are struggling to feed and care for the children they already have. Some will
be older women, married or single, who have already raised a family. Denied the ability to control their reproductive
capacity, the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of liberty is rendered hollow for women.
40
II. THE STATE'S BALD ASSERTION OF A "COMPELLING" INTEREST IN PROTECTING POTENTIAL
LIFE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A RETREAT FROM ROE.
A. A Critique Of Viability Does Not Absolve This Court Of Its Responsibility To Accommodate Women's Funda-
mental Right To Reproductive Autonomy.
According to this Court, the state has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life."' 1 For any given pregnancy, however, promoting this interest by prohibiting abortion necessarily deprives a pregnant
woman of her fundamental right to decide whether and when to bear a child. The Court in Roe concluded that the
state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling to override a woman's right only after the point of fetal viability, and
even then only in cases in which the woman's health is not endangered by continued pregnancy.
Both Missouri and the Solicitor General now ask this Court to relabel the state's interest in protecting potential life
as compelling prior to viability so as to override a woman's right at all times. This extraordinary request is based solely
on the assertion that viability provides an unworkable dividing line. Current medical evidence reveals that this critique is
unfounded. 42 But even were the critique acceptable, the conclusion that the state's interest is always compelling would
not logically follow; the unworkability of viability as a dividing line would equally support the opposite conclusion that
the state's interest in protecting potential life is never sufficiently compelling to outweigh a woman's fundamental right to
choose abortion. Hence, the critique of viability merely begs the central question of how to evaluate the state's asserted
interest in the context of abortion restrictions.
Where giving effect to a state interest - even one asserted to be "compelling" in the abstract - entails interference
with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as the right to choose abortion, this Court struggles to protect the right
and closely scrutinizes the context and manner in which the interest is asserted. The Court has carefully evaluated, for
example, whether the state's proposed infringement on the right is narrowly tailored to promoting the asserted interest,'4
whether the manner in which the state pursues the interest may reflect or perpetuate stereotypes,"" and whether the
interest outweighs in importance the protection of a particular right in a particular context."5 These inquiries reflect a
consistent judgment that even extremely weighty interests do not easily justify interference with fundamental rights;'"
therefore, this Court must examine closely Missouri's assertion of an interest in potential life sufficiently compelling to
prohibit abortion from the moment of conception.
While Missouri relies on its flawed critique of the viability distinction, several of Missouri's amici curiae suggest that
support for the existence of a broad compelling interest in potential life lies in various states' recognition of the fetus as a
legal person under property, tort and criminal law. This argument is unpersuasive. Without question, states possess
sufficiently important interests to justify such recognition of the fetus in certain limited contexts. For example, granting a
cause of action for prenatal injuries resulting from the tortious conduct of others compensates the subsequently born
child and his or her parents for the injuries, and also deters such tortious acts.'7 These and similar measures properly
promote the interests and well-being of the child, while at the same time promoting the interests of the pregnant woman.
But acceptance of such measures provides no guidance for the treatment of the very different clash of asserted state
interest and fundamental right involved in the abortion context.
40. Overruling Roe would also severely constrain the lives, not only of women who become pregnant, but of all women. If women
no longer had the right to choose abortion, all women capable of bearing children would have to attempt to plan their lives knowing
that, as long as contraceptive devices fail, their lives might be interrupted at any time by an unwanted pregnancy.
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
42. See, e.g., Brief of Neurobiologists and Neonatologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees.
43. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 57 U.S.L.W. 4251, 4253 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989); see also
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979) (states must "adopt the least drastic means to
achieve their ends").
44. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of
racial considerations in furthering that interest.")(emphasis added).
46. Thus, for example, the Court has recognized that, although "as a general proposition" the government "has a vital national
interest" in protecting foreign diplomats in accordance with international law, that interest is not "automatically ...compelling"
when its assertion infringes upon First Amendment rights. Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1165 (1988); see also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.
Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988) (defendant's Sixth Amendment rights "outweighed" state's interest in "protecting victims of sexual abuse");
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Court cannot "distort Constitution to approve all
that the [state] may deem expedient" and in the national interest when fundamental rights are at stake).
47. Similarly, penalizing third parties for causing a woman's pregnancy to terminate without her consent, either through civil
wrongful death actions or criminal "feticide" laws, protects pregnant women from serious physical harm, severe bodily intrusion, and
the termination of wanted pregnancies.
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B. Recognition Of A Compelling State Interest In Protecting Potential Life Throughout Pregnancy Would Both
Completely Eviscerate Women's Right To Choose Abortion And Portend Even Broader Invasions Of Women's
Fundamental Rights.
This Court has never accepted such a broad interest as compelling so as to eliminate virtually all constitutional
protection afforded a fundamental right. Were this Court to accept Missouri's blanket contention that its interest in
potential life outweighs women's fundamental right to procreative autonomy at all stages of pregnancy, states would be
free to criminalize abortion in virtually all circumstances,49 to investigate all abortions to determine whether they were
spontaneous or intentionally induced,49 and then to prosecute for murder women who intentionally ended their
pregnancies.50 In analogous circumstances where a state proffered an interest which, if deemed compelling, would have
had "no logical stopping point" and would have completely overridden a particular constitutional right, this Court has
refused to recognize the interest as compelling. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723
(1989) (interest in redressing generalized societal discrimination deemed not to be sufficiently compelling to justify race-
conscious remedies because it "has no logical stopping point") (citation omitted); id. at 723 (interest in providing role
models deemed not to be sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious remedies because it "could be used to 'justify'
race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and duration"). 1
Indeed, recognition of a broad "compelling" interest in protecting potential life necessarily would legitimize many
other state intrusions on procreative autonomy that would be "essentially limitless in scope and duration. '52 Missouri's
reasoning would allow states to criminalize the use of any contraceptive devices, such as intrauterine devices and the Pill,
that prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum after conception. More fundamentally, since the "potentiality" of life
exists equally before sperm-ovum fusion as after, states could invoke the same "compelling" interest proffered here to
justify laws prohibiting the use or sale of all contraceptives. At bottom, embracing the position advocated by Missouri
would not only require the reversal of Roe, but would also call into question Griswold and Eisenstadt as well.5
Moreover, embracing Missouri's position would also provide states with an open-ended invitation to force pregnant
women to act in whatever ways the state determined were optinial for the fetus, thereby reducing pregnant women to no
more than fetal containers. A frightening preview of the potential intrusions is found in Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.205 itself (part
of which is at issue here), which states that "[tihe life of each human being begins at conception" and "[u]nborn
children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being." A Missouri court relied on section 1.205 in ordering a
pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section against her wishes, finding that "the life, health and well-being" of her
fetus "may be jeopardized" by her decision. Deaconess Hosp. v. McRoberts, No. 874-00172 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. May 21,
1987).
Within a month of this Missouri case, a District of Columbia court granted a hospital's similar request for an order
compelling a woman who was critically ill with cancer to undergo a cesarean section, despite the unanimous objections of
the woman, her family and her physicians and despite the uncontroverted fact that it might hasten the woman's death.
See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated & reh'g en banc granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988). The fetus was
not viable and did not survive; the woman herself died two days later. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which
had refused to stay the order, issued an opinion subsequent to the woman's death in which it stated "we well know that
we may have shortened [her] life span" but concluded that the value of her remaining life was outweighed by the "slim"
chance that the fetus might survive. 533 A.2d at 613-14, 617. 54
Although cases citing protection of fetal interests to justify other types of infringements upon pregnant women's
autonomy have been relatively rare - largely because of Roe - a handful of such cases have arisen in the last decade.
Courts have jailed pregnant women based on a belief that the women might act contrary to the interests of the fetuses
48. Accepting Missouri's recharacterization would allow states to criminalize abortions even when a woman's pregnancy is the
result of rape or incest, and when childbearing poses a serious risk to the woman's health or life. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118(Texas criminal statute proscribed all abortions except those necessary to protect life of pregnant woman).
49. Approximately 31 % of all pregnancies terminate by spontaneous abortion prior to the third trimester. Wilcox, Weinberg,
O'Connor, Baird, Schlatterer, Canfield, Armstrong & Nisula, Incidence of Early Loss of Pregnancy, 319 New Eng. J. Med. 189
(1988).
50. Moreover, complete strangers could have free reign to intervene in the lives of women and their families. This troubling
scenario was actually played out in the recent case of In re Klein, No. 1736-89 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 8, 1989). There, a man
requested guardianship of his comatose, pregnant wife for the purpose of authorizing an abortion he believed could improve her
chances of recovery. Two anti-abortion activists who had never even met the Klein family sought to intervene and prevent the abor-
tion. Relying in part on Roe, a New York appellate court ruled that "these absolute strangers to the Klein family, whatever their
motivation, have no place in the midst of this family tragedy." Slip op. at 4.
51. See also Cohen v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (interest in preserving public order deemed not to be sufficiently weighty
to justify restrictions on free expression because it is "inherently boundless").
52. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723.
53. To be sure, the probability that any given act of sexual intercourse will lead to the birth of a child is less than 100%. But the
probability that any given embryo will lead to a live birth is itself only approximately 69%. See supra note 49. In any case, some
potential for life still exists even prior to conception, and if a state attempted to protect that life by proscribing the use of contracep-
tives, this Court would be hard-pressed to justify a constitutional ruling that the state's interest in postconception potential life is
compelling but its interest in preconception potential life is not.
54. Courts in at least 11 states have ordered women to submit to cesarean sections. See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-
Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 New Eng. J. Med. 1192 (1987) (also citing six cases in which courts refused to order such
surgery).
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they carried." A woman was prosecuted and faced imprisonment for allegedly waiting "many hours" before seeking
medical help after she noticed some vaginal bleeding and experienced some uterine contractions." In another case, a
child was allowed to sue his mother to recover for prenatal injuries allegedly caused by the woman's failure to act as a
"reasonable" pregnant woman. 57
If this Court accepts a compelling state interest in the fetus from conception, laws like section 1.205 could be used to
force women to submit not only to cesarean sections, but also to other types of surgery and medical treatment deemed to
be in the interest of the fetuses they carry, including in utero fetal surgery. Pregnant women could be denied medical
care needed to protect their own health, such as radiation or chemotherapy to treat cancer or the use of prescription or
nonprescription drugs. A wide range of common conditions and conduct arguably posing some threat to fetal health
could provoke state intervention, criminal prosecution or civil liability, including: being overweight, being underweight,
exercising, not exercising, failing to eat "well," failing to "stay off of her feet," smoking, drinking alcohol, ingesting
caffeine, and suffering physical harm due to negligence.
In short, acceptance of Missouri's assertion of a broad compelling interest in protecting potential life would do far
more than eviscerate the fundamental right to abortion, already an unprecedented step at odds with the Court's consis-
tent effort to balance state interests with individual rights. It would also provide the constitutional foundation for a
frontal assault on other fundamental liberties.
C. The Imposition of Unparalleled Burdens Only On Women To Service The State's Asserted Interest In Potential
Life Impermissibly Reflects and Reinforces Outmoded Stereotypes Of Women As Childbearers.
Missouri's decision to advance its interest through pre-viability abortion restrictions must also be rejected because it
entails the resurrection of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about women's proper role in society. Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam). States have long sought to restrict women's autonomy and opportuni-
ties for participation in public life, citing women's ability to bear children as the principal justification for this unequal
and disadvantageous treatment. For example, states excluded women from certain professions," limited the hours
women could work outside the home," and discouraged women's involvement in political and civic affairs."0
For many years this Court accepted such detrimental treatment as the "natural" consequence of women's reproduc-
tive capacities and as furthering important state interests, such as "preserv[ing] the strength and vigor of the race."
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). This Court has now soundly rejected the outmoded view that "the female
[is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family," Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975), and it has
invalidated legislation that perpetuates women's image as the "'weaker sex' or ... child rearers." Califano, 430 U.S. at
317. Despite the likely absence of malicious intentions and the widespread acceptance (even among women) of unequal
treatment, the Court has recognized that the Constitution prohibits the state from disadvantaging any individual woman
on the basis of stereotypes."
The Court has therefore refused to accept asserted state interests that reflect "traditional ... assumptions about the
proper roles of men and women." Mississippi Univ.for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982). In Hogan itself, the
Court precluded Mississippi from operating a women-only nursing school, rejecting the state's asserted interest in in-
creasing educational opportunities for women because the state's action gave "credibility to the old view that women, not
men, should become nurses . . . ." Id. at 730.
Abortion restrictions reflect and reinforce the same stereotypes of women that this Court has found illegitimate. By
requiring women to sacrifice their bodies and their liberty in ways that the state never demands of men, states manifest
55. A District of Columbia court recently ordered the incarceration of a woman solely to prevent her from using cocaine during
the remainder of her pregnancy. See United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1989). The
woman had pled guilty to the misdemeanor of second degree theft (for check forgery); the prosecutor recommended that the woman
not be jailed and the judge stated that he would have accepted the recommendation but for the fact that the woman was pregnant and
tested positive for cocaine use. In fact, the judge indicated that he might even jail a pregnant woman to prevent her from ingesting
alcohol or smoking cigarettes. Id. at 442.
See also In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (reversing juvenile court's order that women with
alleged mental illness be institutionalized during last two months of pregnancy; appellate decision came only after woman had given
birth and been released).
56. The woman's pregnancy was complicated by a dangerous condition, placenta previa, which caused her to hemorrhage and lose
a great deal of blood. Her son was born with severe brain damage and died within six weeks. The woman was prosecuted for causing
her son's death through her own loss of blood. See People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 27, 1987) (transcript
of decision); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Complaint Without Leave to Amend and
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, People v. Stewart.
57. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981). But see Stallman v. Younquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d
355, 359 (1988) (court refused to recognize cause of action for prenatal injuries in suit filed by girl against her mother, noting that
otherwise "[m]other and child would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception until birth").
58. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (women excluded from practice of law).
59. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
60. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (women exempted from jury duty), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (women exempted from paying poll tax if they "chose" not to vote).
61. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality) ("[O]ur Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination ... rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.").
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the stereotype that it is women's "natural role" to bear children. The fact that the state's interest in depriving women of
control over their own reproductive capacities can be cloaked in noble terms does not diminish the actual harm and
invasion of liberty suffered by individual women denied abortion. And the fact that many people (including women)
presently are not troubled by this stereotype is no more constitutionally relevant today than was the popularity of "ro-
mantic paternalism" many years ago. Just as previous state limitations on women's ability to participate in public life
presumed that the "paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother," Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141, laws that deprive women of their ability to choose whether to end a pregnancy force
women to fulfill that same destiny.
Moreover, reinforcing this stereotype by upholding restrictive abortion laws would lead states once again to restrict
women's autonomy in the name of enforcing their "motherly duties" in the non-abortion contexts discussed above.62 The
Court held in 1908 that states could limit the hours women worked outside the home because work was thought harmful
to reproductive capacity: "[working long hours has] injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential
to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race." Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. We risk repeating and even worsening this "long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination," Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality), by allowing
states, in the name of fetal protection, to control women's decisions and actions regarding employment, medical treat-
ment, exercise, diet and overall lifestyle.6"
Although Missouri asserts an interest in compelling unwilling women to sacrifice their bodies, health and well-being
for nine months to protect potential life, Missouri and other states never impose comparable duties on men to protect
actual life. The value that our law attaches to the individual right to liberty is so great that people are generally not
required to reach out to aid another person, even when it is possible to save another from grave injury or certain death at
little or no risk to one's self."' Particularly instructive is McFall v. Shimp, in which the court refused to order a man to
donate bone marrow, a procedure far less risky and painful than many aspects of pregnancy and childbirth, even though
the donation was necessary to save the life of his cousin. According to the court:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no legal compulsion
to give aid or to take action to save that human being or to rescue .... For our law to compel the Defendant to
submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To
do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, .... and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (Allegheny Cty. 1978) (per curiam)."
To permit the state's interest in potential life to prevail over women's fundamental rights would have the perverse
62. See discussion supra at 10.
63. Many of the amici curiae supporting Appellants reveal that their willingness to impose unprecedented burdens on women
through forced childbearing stems from their own stereotyped views of women. Some amici curiae portray women as incapable of
moral decisionmaking. See, e.g., Brief of Covenant House and Good Counsel, Inc., Amici Curiae 9-10, 17 (discussing wide variety of
behavior of pregnant women that could harm fetus, from smoking to obtaining inadequate prenatal care, and concluding that state
must protect potential life from conception "[i]f any children are to have reasonable assurances of healthy birth and productive life").
Others describe women as the victims of their own abortion decisions. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Focus on the Family, and
Family Research Council of America, in Support of Appellants 13-24 (purporting to describe adverse medical and psychological risks
of abortion, as well as "serious sexual problems experienced by women who had abortions"). Virtually all trivialize or deny entirely
the tremendous harms to women's liberty, equality and health inflicted by state restrictions on abortion. See, e.g., Brief of the United
States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants 15-19 (downplaying medical risks of pregnancy and denying
existence of pre-Roe maternal mortality and morbidity due to illegal abortion).
64. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, The Law of Torts § 56, at 375-76 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Torts § 314 (1965); Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 2(b),(c) (19xx) (organ donations unlawful if made against wishes of
decedent).
A small number of states require people to stop at the scene of or report an accident. These requirements do not, however, present
passersby with any risk of physical harm. For example, the Minnesota Good Samaritan statute specifies that assistance is never
required if providing it poses a "danger or peril to self or others." Minn. Stat. § 604.05 Subdiv. 1 (1988). Nor does the law ever
require a father to put himself at appreciable physical risk to help his child. Professor Tribe notes that "the law nowhere forces men to
devote their bodies and restructure their lives even in those tragic situations (such as organ transplants) where nothing less will permit
their children to survive." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1354 (2d ed. 1988); see also Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1588 (1979) ("[C]onsider a simple burning building, with a child trapped inside. Would a court impose criminal
liability on anyone, even the child's parent, who did not attempt to save the child at the risk of second-degree burns over one or two
percent of his or her body? . . . [E]ven if the potential rescuer is specified to be the child's parent, liability is unlikely. In all other
cases, the suggested imposition is unthinkable in the context of our legal system.").
65. See also In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1975) (rejecting family's attempt to force
incompetent schizophrenic man to donate kidney to sister because of "the absence of real consent on his part," even where dire need
of transfer was established).
In addition, the medical risks to which Missouri would subject unconsenting pregnant women starkly contrast with the right of
consent afforded all others. Ordinarily when a person faces serious medical risks that might result from recommended surgery, the
choice lies with that individual whether to accept those risks and consent to the procedure. At common law it was recognized that "a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d
656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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effect of elevating fetuses to "superhuman" status by giving fetuses protections that states do not give to persons. This
provides further evidence that this legislative "trade-off" rests upon an illegitimate stereotype that women are essentially,
and "naturally," childbearers, and that women are therefore appropriate targets for a subordination of bodily freedom
and autonomy that never has been and never would be placed in comparable fashion upon others in society. Just as the
right of a potential donor or rescuer to refuse to help is fully protected by the common law's respect for bodily freedom,
so too must the law respect the right of a woman to choose whether to undergo the great burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth.
This Court is asked to view the state's interest in protecting potential life as so compelling that it eviscerates women's
fundamental right to reproductive choice throughout pregnancy. The Court has never before found a purported state
interest to be compelling in a context where that interest would justify intrusions with "no logical stopping point" on a
fundamental right.6" The Court in Roe understood and discharged its responsibility to protect fundamental rights from
undue government interference by allowing women's right and the state's interest to supersede each other at different
temporal stages of pregnancy. Retreating today from this commitment to the safeguarding of fundamental rights would
cede complete control over women's (and only women's) reproductive autonomy (and hence a core aspect of their social,
economic and political freedom) to a political process that frequently has failed to treat women fairly; particularly given
the highly charged emotional environment in which legislative "balances" necessarily would be struck, legislatures can
be expected again to undervalue both the importance of protecting women's autonomy and the burdens of state-imposed
continued pregnancy and childbirth. Allowing state legislatures to dictate women's most intimate and fundamental deci-
sions in life would fail utterly to respect the Constitution as an operative restraint on unwarranted legislative intrusions
on fundamental liberties and would fail to discharge this Court's duty to be the "ultimate guardian" of those liberties.
CONCLUSION
To ensure that the constitutional guarantee of liberty "extends to women as well as to men," Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 772, this Court must reaffirm Roe v. Wade and prohibit states from forcing women to continue pregnancies through
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66. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723. Even if the Court found the asserted interest in protecting potential life "compelling," abortion
restrictions would still fail heightened scrutiny because they are not the least restrictive means of promoting this interest. For example,
the Surgeon General of the United States' recent report on abortion concludes that governments could curtail the incidence of abor-
tion through various non-coercive means, such as implementing sex education programs and subsidizing the costs of childbearing and
rearing for women bearing unplanned children. See Surgeon General's Report on Abortion, reprinted in 135 Cong. Rec. E906, E909(daily ed. March 21, 1989).
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